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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LOWELL SINGLETON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040731-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18A-l(2)(a) and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 Whether the trial court correctly concluded that an officer lacked reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the detainment of Singleton? 
The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 
UT 94, f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.2d 699. This issue was preserved in the State's 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R. 67-56), and at the 
evidentiary hearing (R. 97). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State appeals from the dismissal of the charges against Singleton after the 
Fourth District granted his motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Singleton was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone 
with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-
37-8(l)(a)(iii) (R 5-4). Singleton moved to suppress the evidence (R. 55-49). After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and suppressed the 
evidence (R. 81-77). A copy of the trial court's order is included in the Addendum. The 
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State subsequently moved to dismiss the matter with prejudice; and the trial court 
certified that suppression of the evidence substantially impaired the State's ability to 
prosecute the case and dismissed the case with prejudice (R. 87-86). The State timely 
appealed (R. 89-88). The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 91). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 3, 2004, at approximately midnight, Officer Robert Welcker of the 
American Fork Police Department was on patrol in a marked police car (R. 97: 7-8, 10). 
Welcker had just "checked" a church parking lot and decided to drive through a trailer 
park (R. 97: 8). Welcker testified that the trailer park was a problem drug area for the 
city, particiularly at night, and that dozens of controlled buys and been orchestrated there 
(R. 97: 8, 9). 
As Welcker turned left to enter the area, he observed a jeep parked on the right 
side of the road and two individuals standing in front of the vehicle (R. 97: 8). The two 
men were later identified as Stephen Lundy and the defendant, Lowell Singleton. On 
cross-examination, Welcker admitted that where the jeep was parked could be a logical 
place for a visitor to one of the trailers towards the entrance to park (R. 97: 22). 
As Welcker was approaching in his vehicle he observed "some hand-to-hand 
actions. I have no idea what was occurring other than there was some hand-to-hand 
actions" (R. 97: 12; 97: 22). Welcker testified that it could have been an exchange of 
drugs (Id.). Welcker has also seen similar exchanges that were not drug related (R. 97: 
22). 
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Welcker stopped his vehicle behind and to the left of the jeep, which had its 
engine running (R. 97: 10-11). Welckei testified that "As soon as I pulled up, stopped, 
Mr. Singleton-he was facing my direction-kind of looked my direction and then turned 
and walked off towards the trailer park (R. 97: 11). The other individual (Lundy) 
"turned and walked back toward the passenger's side of the jeep" (R. 97: 11). Welcker 
approached Lundy to speak with him and noticed that Lundy was kicking something 
underneath the jeep: "He appeared to be kicking the snow. There was freshly laid snow" 
(R. 97: 12). 
After making contact with Lundy, Welcker yelled at Singleton-who was still 
walking towards the trailer park and w&s approximately 100 feet away-to "stand still or 
come back so that I could talk with him" (R. 97: 13, 25). Welcker admitted on cross-
examination that he has used a stem voice-especially at night-in order to get individuals 
to obey his commands (R. 97: 24). 
Welcker testified that Singleton was free to leave and that he would have 
continued his contact with Lundy had Singleton not responded to his command (R. 97: 
13). Welcker did not convey to Singleton that he was free to continue walking (R. 97: 
25). 
Singleton returned to the vehicle and Welcker had him stand where he could be 
seen on the left side of the jeep (R. 97: 14). Welcker detained Singleton while he talked 
with Lundy and investigated the matter (R. 97: 14-15). 
Lundy told Welcker that he had met the defendant to talk about giving him a ride 
and that they had finished the conversation when the officer arrived (R. 97: 16). Lundy 
also denied kicking anything (R. 97: 15-16). 
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Other officers then arrived and "other contact was made with Mr. Singleton" (R. 
97: 16). 
Welcker then checked underneath the jeep and found a small baggy of what he 
believed to be methamphetamine (R. 97: 16-17). Lundy immediately informed Welcker 
that the two occupants inside the jeep were not aware of why he was there (R. 97: 17). 
Welcker then informed Lundy that he was under arrest and Lundy was read his Miranda 
rights (R. 97: 17). Lundy initially told Welcker that he was planning to sell the drugs to 
Singleton (Id.). However, Lundy subsequently changed his story and indicated that he 
had purchased the drugs from Singleton for $70.00 (paid in three $20 bills and one $10 
bill) that was neatly folded in "fourths" (R. 97: 17-18). 
During Welcker's intermittent contacts with Singleton, he was also informed by 
Singleton that the two were meeting about a ride to Salt Lake (R. 97: 19). But that when 
Welcker asked him why he wasn't going with Lundy, "Singleton really didn't have an 
explanation why he had walked off instead of taking the ride" (R. 97: 19). 
Welcker subsequently learned that their was an outstanding arrest warrant for 
Singleton (R. 97: 19, 27). Incident to arrest, Welcker searched Singleton's person and 
wallet. In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker found seventy dollars in cash as 
described by Lundy along with other money that was "wadded up" (R. 97: 19-20). 
Singleton denied any drug transaction with Lundy and refused to speak with Welcker 
further (R. 97: 20). 
Singleton and Lundy were subsequently transported to the Utah County Jail by 
Officer William Loveridge (R 97: 21). Eight days later Loveridge found 15 baggies 
containing a white powdery substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. This was 
the same back seat where Singleton had Deen sitting and nobody had been in the back of 
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Loveridge's patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to the jail (R. 
73). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion based on reasonable articulable facts to justify the level two detention of 
Singleton and subsequent warrants check and search, and it was therefore an 
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The record shows that the officer lacked specific articulable facts to support 
detaining and searching Singleton and running a warrants check. The officer's reason 
for detaining Singleton was Singleton's presence at a trailer court at midnight, a location 
known to the officer as a high crime area in which drug trafficking was common, and 
witnessing some kind of hand to hand exchange between Singleton and another 
individual. Singleton asserts that under such circumstances, without more, the trial court 
correctly granted his motion to suppress and subsequently dismissed the charges against 
him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WERE NO SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE FACTS OF CRIMINAL 
BEHAVIOR SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS 
LEVEL TWO DETENTION OF SINGLETON 
Singleton asserts that the trial court was correct in concluding that the officer had 
lacked sufficient specific, articulable facts suggesting that he was engaged in criminal 
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activity and that the level two detention of him and subsequent search and warrants 
check were violative of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the 
Utah Constitution were created to protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 
Const. Amend. IV. 
Because there were not sufficient reasonable, articulable facts that Singleton was 
engaged in any criminal activity, the officer's level two detention and search of 
Singleton, and the subsequent warrants check were unreasonable and violated 
Singleton's rights under the State and Federal Constitutions. Accordingly, the trial court 
was correct in granting the motion to suppress. 
It well established that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each 
requiring a different degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ray, 
2000 UT App. 55, flO, 998 P.2d 274, see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions 
a suspect. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at f 10. An officer may approach and question a suspect 
at any time so long as the person in not detained against his will. Id. The second level is 
reached when an officer detains an individual. Id. The United States Supreme Court has 
declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when the officer 
has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (1996) (quoting 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641-42, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 
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(1983)). The third level is arrest, which requires that the officer have probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^ [10. 
Singleton asserts that trial court correctly concluded this was a level two stop and 
the State does not challenge this conclusion. 
Effecting a level two detention, searching, and running a warrants check on an 
individual without sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal activity is a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); 
and Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453. 
In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court found the following: 
1. On January 3, 2004, Officer Robert Welcker of the American Fork 
Police Department was on patrol in a marked police car at approximately 
midnight when he witnessed what he believed to be a suspicious 
circumstance. 
2- Welcker observed a vehicle parked with the engine running and the 
lights turned off at the entrance to a trailer park. 
3. Welcker knew this trailer park to be a high crime area in which drug 
trafficking was common. In fact, Welcker had purchased drugs in this 
exact location previously, as an undercover police officer. 
4. Welcker observed two people conduct some kind of transaction in 
which they exchanged something hand to hand near the parked vehicle. 
Welcker pulled his patrol car behind the parked vehicle. He did not block 
the vehicle's exit. 
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5. As Welcker approached the vehicle, one of the individuals, later 
identified as Stephen Lundy turned and walked to the passenger side of the 
vehicle. The second individual, later identified as the defendant, Lowell 
Singleton turned and walked towards the trailer court. 
6. Welcker got out of his patrol car and approached the vehicle. As he 
approached the vehicle he saw Lundy kick something into the snow under 
the car. 
7. Welcker asked Lundy to approach him at the rear of the vehicle and 
commanded Singleton in a stern voice to come back to the vehicle. 
8. Welcker detained Singleton while he talked with Lundy and 
investigated the matter. 
9. After obtaining a statement from Lundy, Welcker searched 
Singleton's person and wallet. In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker 
found seventy dollars in cash. 
10. During his investigation Welcker located a warrant for Singleton's 
arrest. Singleton was arrested on the warrant and transported to jail by 
Officer Loveridge. 
11. Welcker's detention of Singleton's person lasted approximately 15 
minutes in its entirety. 
12. On January 11,8 days after Singleton was arrested and transported 
to the jail, Loveridge found 15 baggies containing a white powdery 
substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. This was the same back 
seat where Singleton had been sitting and nobody had been in the back of 
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Loveridge's patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to 
the jail. 
(R. 81-79). The State has not challenged these factual findings on appeal, therefore this 
Court must assume these findings are correct. 
The two cases cited by the State to support their position that the circumstances 
under which the officer detained Singleton were supported by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion are distinguishable from the case at hand. In State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 
160, Tj 2, 47 P.3d 932, the officer observed occupants of a vehicle which had no license 
plates, on a street with a known drug house, parked in a manner that obstructed traffic, 
make a hand-to-hand transaction with a pedestrian who walked away rapidly as the 
police car turned around to park behind the other vehicle. Because the road was so 
narrow, the officers had to slow their vehicle to five miles per hour in order to get around 
the car. Id. While passing the vehicle, the officers noticed the defendant pass something 
to one of the two individuals in the car. Id. One officer noted that the exchange drew his 
attention because "it was accomplished in a manner that is commonly used in drug 
transactions." Id. at ^ 2, 9. This Court found that such facts constituted articulable, 
reasonable suspicion to justify a detention. 
In the second case, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 
570 (2000), officers from the special operations section of the Chicago police 
department-in a four vehicle caravan-converged on an area "known for heavy narcotics 
trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions" expecting "to find a crowd of people 
in the area, including lookouts and customers." 120 S.Ct. at 674. Two officers saw 
defendant standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. Id. at 675. When 
Defendant saw the officers, he ran away. Id. The officers pursued defendant, stopped 
10 
him, and frisked him, uncovering a .38 caliber handgun with five live rounds of 
ammunition. Id. The Supreme Court noted that presence in an area of expected criminal 
activity is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion but rather location is 
one relevant contextual consideration in making such a determination. Id. (citing Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), md Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed. 612 (1972)). In reaching its decision that the 
officers' action in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court 
relied on the importance of the defendant's act of "headlong flight." Id. at 676-677. 
The case at hand is distinguishable from the above cases in many respects. First, 
unlike the situation in Beach, in the case at hand there wasn't a car without license plates, 
parked in a manner that obstructed traffic. In other words, Welcker had observed no 
violations-or potential violations—of traffic laws. The jeep in this case which was 
simply parked outside a trailer court (R. 80). 
Second, in contrast to Beach and Wardlow, Singleton was not involved in 
"headlong flight" or even "walking away rapidly." Rather, the trial court's findings 
indicate that as Officer Welcker approached the vehicle, Singleton turned and walked 
towards the trailer court. (R. 80 If 5). In Wardlow, the Court recognized that nervous, 
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, and that 
"headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion. It is not 
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Wardlow, at 
124, 120 S.Ct. at 676. Unlike the defendants in Beach and Wardlow however, 
Singleton's action of simply walking away cannot be considered in the same nervous, 
evasive class as "headlong flight" or even "walking away rapidly," particularly when 
Officer Welcker acknowledged that he hadn't observed Singleton doing anything that he 
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construed as nervous behavior prior to asking him to come back to the vehicle. (R. 97 at 
24). 
Finally, as opposed to the situations in Beach and Wardlow, it appears that in this 
case Officer Welcker did not himself seem to believe he had observed specific, 
articulable criminal behavior on the part of Singleton to justify effecting a level two 
detention. During direct examination Officer Welcker testified that, in asking Singleton 
to return to the car, he recalled saying something like, "Sir, can you come back here, 
please" and stated that Singleton was not under arrest and was free to leave at that point. 
(R. 97 at 13). Furthermore, he testified that Singleton could have continued to walk 
away and he would have remained focused on his questioning of Lundy, whom the 
officer had observed kick something underneath the vehicle. (R. 97 at 12, 13). The trial 
judge also heard Officer Welcker testify during direct examination somewhat 
equivocally, that after he had stopped his vehicle, he had "no idea what was occurring 
there other than there was some hand-to-hand actions." (R. 97 at 12). In response to the 
follow-up question of whether in his training and experience as a narcotics officer, could 
this possibly be an exchange of drugs, he responded that "[i]t could be." (R. 97 at 12). 
Welcker also acknowledged that he had also seen similar exchanges that were not drug 
related (R. 97: 22). This testimony, taken as a whole, is not the testimony of an officer 
who asserts, let alone believes, there was sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to justify a level two detention of Singleton. 
Accordingly, Singleton asserts that the trial court was correct in concluding that 
"the facts that Welcker relied upon for His belief that Singleton was involved in a drug 
transaction "are not sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion" (R. 79 at f^ 2). 
Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled-and the State has not challenged-that all 
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evidence obtained as a result of the illegal detention and subsequent search must be 
excluded; and that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply. See, State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990;, and JVcc v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 
2501, 81L.Ed.2d377. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Singleton asks that this Court affirm the decision of the 
trial court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because the 
officers actions were not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of April, 2005. 
^ 
Margare#P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellee to Jeff Gray, Assistant Attorney General, Appeals Division, P.O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this 8th day of April, 2005. 
O^y^ 
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RICHARD P. GALE (7054) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
145 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
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W THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JTATEOFUTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
s. 
.OWELL SINGLETON 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 041400234 
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
This matter came before the court for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress on June 
0,2004. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel, Richard P. Gale. The State 
ras represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Donna Kelly. The court heard from Officer 
.obert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department and received by stipulation a type 
Titten proffer of Officer Wilham Loveridge's testimony. Both parties submitted facts and law 
resented in their memoranda filed with the court. The Court having considered the Evidence, 
lotions, and Memoranda of the parties does hereby make and enter the following Findings of 
act, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Zhe court finds the facts are as follows: 
1. On January 3,2004, Officer Robert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department 
was on patrol when he witnessed what he believed to be a suspicious circumstance. This 
occurred at a late hour approximately . ^ ^ l l s 0 5 S . ( (K< 0 0 VWSUCAJVKX^MA . 
2. Welcker observed a vehicle parked with the engine running and the lights turned off at 
the entrance to a trailer park. 
3. Welcker knew this trailer park to be a high crime area in which drug trafficking was 
common. In fact, Welcker had purchased drugs in this exact location previously^ (X S <M\ 1 ^ 
{AAMH^co\t^r police, or£Bca&~* 
4. Welcker observed two people conduct some kind a transaction in which they exchanged 
something hand to hand near the parked vehicle. Welcker pulled his patrol car behind the 
parked vehicle. He did not block the vehicle's exit. 
5. As Welcker approached the vehicle, one of the individuals, later identified as Stephen 
Lundy turned and walked to the passenger side of the vehicle. The second individual, later 
identified as the defendant, Lowell Singleton turned and walked towards the trailer court. 
6. Welcker got out of his patrol car and approached the vehicle. As he approached the 
vehicle he saw Lundy kick something into the snow under the car. 
7. Welcker asked Lundy to approach him at the rear of the vehicle and commanded 
Singleton in a stern voice to come back to the vehicle. 
8. Welcker detained Singleton while he talked with Lundy and investigated the matter. 
9. After obtaining a statement from Lundy, Welcker searched Singleton's person and wallet. 
In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker found seventy dollars in cash. 
10. During his investigation Welcker located a warrant for Singleton's arrest. Singleton was 
arrested on the warrant and transported to jail by Officer Loveridge. 
11. Welcker' s detention of Singleton5 s person lasted approximately 15 minutes in its entirety. 
12. On January 11,8 days after Singleton was arrested and transported to the jail, Loveridge 
found 15 baggies containing a white powdery substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. 
This was the same back seat where Singleton had been sitting and nobody had been in the back 
of Loveridge5s patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to the jail.. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that when Officer Welcker commanded Singleton to return to the 
vehicle he was detaining Singleton which constituted a level two encounter. The United States 
Supreme Court has declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when 
lie officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Chapman 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996) (quoting United 
itates v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). 
The court concludes that when Welcker stopped Singleton Welcker suspected that 
ingleton was involved in a drug transaction. However, the facts that Welcker relied upon for 
is belief are not sufficient to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion. 
The court concludes it was only after Singleton had already been illegally detained that 
ingleton was searched and a warrant for his arrest was located and Singleton was arrested. 
The court concludes that if Singleton had not been illegally detained he would not have 
;en searched or arrested. Hence, any evidence found on his person and in the patrol car would 
>t have been discovered. 
The court concludes that the inevitable discovery doctrine as set forth in Nix v. Williams, 
7 U.S. 431, 443-444 (1984) does not apply because the state did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the evidence ultimately would have been discovered by 
lawful means. Had Singleton not been illegally detained Officer Welcher and allowed to leave 
the scene, Welcker would not have been able to verify Singleton's identity or locate the warrant 
for Singleton's arrest. 
ORDER 
Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders that 
any and all evidence discovered due to the illegal detention of the defendant including money 
found on his person and evidence found in the patrol car be suppressed as fruit of an illegal 
detention and search. 
Signed this _7 day of July, 2004 . \F IN RED
 /A. 
Approved as to form: ? W ^ ^ \ 
Anthony W. Sdhofield \ • U ^ X a ^ ^ ? 'P 
District Court Judge "t ->>V ..^ s*4i 
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